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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the influence of women on the boards of directors of National 
Health Service Foundation Trusts (FTs) in England. FTs provide a public service where 
social performance is the primary objective, although financial constraints must be met. 
Female presence (the proportion of women) is higher for executive directors than non-
executives, reflecting the high number of women employed in the sector. We find that a high 
female presence among executive and non-executive directorships does not result in 
significant differences either in financial return or service quality. When gender diversity on 
boards is consistently high (high level of female presence across boards), the benefits on 
performance of having more women on the board may not be discernible. However, female 
Chairs or Chief Executives result in significant reductions in negative social outcomes, such 
as lower clinical negligence costs, without harming financial management. The findings of 
this study, carried out in a context of high female presence and where a woman frequently 
occupies one of the two most influential board positions, Chair and Chief Executive, have 
implications for gender diversity and gender targets on the boards of directors in business and 
other sectors. 
Keywords: Gender diversity; Board of Directors; Public bodies; NHS Foundation Trust; 
Corporate governance.  
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THE INFLUENCE OF PRESENCE AND POSITION OF WOMEN ON THE BOARDS 
OF DIRECTORS.  
THE CASE OF NHS FOUNDATION TRUSTS 
 
1. Introduction 
There is evidence that female presence on boards positively affects firms’ corporate social 
performance (e.g. Manner, 2010; Boulouta, 2013; Hafsi and Turgut, 2013). Women are 
considered more socially oriented than men, resulting in more effective board decision-
making, particularly on aspects related to social responsibility (Ibrahim and Angelidis, 1994). 
Studies of gender stereotypes, (see Bouluta, 2013) associate women with traits such as 
empathy, caring, concern for others and being interested in relationships of importance to the 
community. Thus, the presence of women on the boards of directors is considered to have 
positive benefits in relation to their social orientation and community representation. Females 
increase the probability of greater diversity on boards. The Financial Reporting Council 
considers it is important to have a diversity of personal attributes, psychological types, 
backgrounds, and gender to ensure that boards of directors are not comprised of like-minded 
individuals and to ensure directors have the intellectual capacity to propose strategy (FRC, 
2011a). 
Studies about gender diversity on the boards of directors of firms usually conclude that 
female presence positively affects firm performance (see e.g. Carter et al, 2003; Campbell 
and Minguez-Vera, 2008; Francoeur et al, 2008; Jurkus et al, 2011). However, Torchia et al 
(2011) state that “in most corporate boards, there is only one woman or a small minority of 
women”. For example, Hafsi and Turgut (2013) find evidence that women contribute to 
better social performance, but they go on to question whether it is a board’s actual ratio of 
female directors that is important or the ratio relative to other boards. Thus, it is not just the 
gender diversity within boards what is important, but also the gender diversity relative to 
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other boards that may be important. They argue it is necessary to distinguish diversity among 
boards from diversity on boards to more fully understand board diversity and performance. 
According to Dezso and Ross (2012) “while scholars have advanced many arguments 
extolling the benefits of gender diversity in top management, rigorous systematic evidence 
regarding how and in what circumstances female representation in top management 
improves firm performance has been lacking.” 
Despite the recent increase in the female presence on boards, figures from the BIS (2011) 
report show that, in industrialised countries, female representation on boards is usually below 
10%. Only the Scandinavian countries (Finland, Norway and Sweden) show figures above 
20%. The Grant Thornton (2011) report on corporate governance in the UK shows that 
females represent less than 10% of the board directors of FTSE 350 firms, and 40% of these 
boards have exclusively male representation. Only 2 of these 350 firms were chaired by a 
woman. Previous academic studies about the influence of female presence on the board of 
directors on firm performance have been mainly conducted in contexts characterised by a 
small number and low proportion of women on boards. Further, the influence of women 
occupying top organisational positions, Chairs or Chief Executives, on organisational 
performance has been barely studied because females infrequently occupy these positions in 
large companies.  
Contrary to the situation in large firms, the Grant Thornton (2012) report on corporate 
governance in the National Health Service (NHS) entities shows that more than one third of 
the voting members of NHS boards are female, with a similar proportion of boards chaired by 
a woman. Our study is carried out in NHS Foundation Trusts (FTs), where female presence 
as Directors, Chairs and Chief Executives is significant and social performance is paramount. 
The purpose of this study is to develop understanding of the benefits on organisational 
performance of having high gender diversity on boards and women in high positions on the 
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board. We investigate these organisations considering two performance dimensions: financial 
performance and service quality performance. FT boards share the same principles and 
common purpose and are influenced by similar factors, thus the gender effect can be 
distinguished. This is particularly pertinent at a time when many western countries and 
supranational organisations, including the European Commission, are implementing policies, 
compulsory or not, to achieve greater female presence in key government and commercial 
entities, and when the NHS is promoting more female appointments at director level. The 
main research questions of this study are: how do high levels of gender diversity on boards of 
directors affect organisational performance when social performance is paramount?; and 
how does the position of women (Chair or Chief Executive) on the boards of directors affect 
organisational performance when social performance is paramount?  
For the purpose of our study, we define “gender diversity” as the presence of women on 
boards. Women, because of their personal attributes and their ability to use them, allow the 
board to approach problems and formulate strategies with alternatives that boards composed 
only of men (or predominantly men) would not consider. Torchia et al (2011) argue that a 
critical mass of women directors is needed for women directors’ to create value and enhance 
board tasks. In line with Torchia and her colleagues, we conjecture that ‘presence’ has to be 
significant, either because of the proportion of women on boards or because of the 
hierarchical position they have (Chair or Chief Executive). Our study helps to confirm and 
extend existing theories and contributes to understanding about the positive influence that 
(more) women and the position held by women may exert on boards of directors. The wider 
implications of the findings include providing insights into the effect that female presence has 
when it reaches levels that are currently seen only as targets in other sectors. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces FTs and their corporate 
governance. Section 3 reviews the literature about gender beliefs and behaviour theories 
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together with the literature on the influence of female presence on the boards of directors of 
commercial companies. These are the theoretical approaches that support our study and help 
to explain the results. Our research questions are proposed at the end of Section 3. Section 4 
explains our research design. Section 5 presents data analyses and results. Section 6 is 
devoted to the discussion of our results, contribution to theory and managerial implications. 
Finally, in Section 7, we state the limitations of our study and areas for future research before 
highlighting our overall conclusions.  
 
2. Corporate governance and gender in NHS Foundation Trusts 
A key feature of the New Public Management reforms has been the adoption by 
public sector bodies of modes of organisation and governance usually associated with the 
private sector (Hood, 1991). In the UK, the more autonomous arrangements replace central 
state ownership with a new form of social ownership characterised by independent public 
interest organisations that are controlled and run locally (Department of Health, 2002). FTs 
are accountable to their local communities, and local ‘governors’ replace ‘shareholders’ in 
the corporate governance structure.  
FTs are public sector organisations, thus, it is important to know some key differences 
from private sector firms, where most studies about gender diversity have been focused. FTs, 
and their independent regulatory agency, Monitor, are particularly embedded to corporate 
governance as developed for the private sector. FTs have boards of directors that are 
structured similarly to those of commercial companies. However, FTs are focused primarily 
on social objectives, social performance is paramount, but they must also achieve financial 
sustainability. We are particularly interested in how female presence influences a public 
service setting where organisations are primarily concerned with providing quality services to 
their local communities, as well as managing financial performance. Previous studies have 
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largely examined social objectives in organisations primarily focused on financial wealth 
creation. 
FTs provide most of hospital and mental health services in England. The NHS, of 
which they are part, is funded from central taxation. The ownership finance of FTs is public 
dividend capital held by the government; there are no independent shareholders. Monitor, the 
independent regulator, oversees their planned financial performance and credit rating as well 
as their service objectives. The intention was that NHS trust should become FTs by 2008, but 
the date for achievement has been postponed by successive governments and transformation 
is still in progress. 
FTs have a membership drawn from its local community who elect governors. 
Monitor’s Code of Governance for FTs (Monitor, 2010) is largely comparable to the codes 
adopted for UK companies. However, higher standards of conduct are required for public 
sector organisations than for private sector firms. In 1995, the Nolan Committee Report set 
out seven principles of good governance in the public sector: selflessness, integrity, 
objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and leadership. Guiding principles for NHS 
boards are developed in The Healthy NHS Board: Principles for Good Governance (NLC, 
2010), which sets out the roles of NHS boards as to: formulate strategy for the organisation; 
ensure accountability by being held to account for the delivery of the strategy; and to shape a 
positive culture to deliver services that meet the needs of patients and communities. Financial 
governance must be balanced with strong clinical governance. These principles should 
condition the decisions and relationships of all board members, irrelevant of their gender.  
The governance structure of the FTs consists of members, governors and the board of 
directors. Figure 1 shows a typical governance structure of a FT. The membership is drawn 
from the local community (the public, patients and staff). The membership and the 
stakeholder organisations, such as universities and city councils, nominate and elect 
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governors. The board of (elected) governors appoints the Chair and non-executive directors 
who, together, appoint the Chief Executive. The latter, along with the Chair and non-
executive directors, appoints the executive directors.  
INSERT FIGURE 1  
As presented in Figure 1, FT boards of directors are a representation of key 
stakeholders, namely, the public (the local community), patients, staff and other stakeholders, 
such as local authorities, universities, Primary Care Trusts and other closely related FTs. 
These key stakeholders are directly present on the board of governors and represented in the 
board of directors. This approach to selection of board directors provides a greater female 
presence on FT boards than for firms (Grant Thornton, 2012). 
The interests of FT stakeholders are primarily social rather than economic. The public 
and patients are concerned about the access to services and their quality. Unlike shareholders, 
they do not have direct financial investment in the organisation. The primary professional 
concern of staff is to provide the best possible care to patients, although they are also 
concerned with financial performance because they consider this may affect their contractual 
conditions and service continuity. Other stakeholders, such as local authorities or 
universities, are concerned about service quality as the main goal of FTs. However, they are 
institutions that manage public resources, so they must have regard to value for money and 
the efficient use of resources and remain financially viable. Executive directors, professional 
managers, are concerned about service quality as the main organisational goal, but are aware 
of the importance of achieving certain financial results in order to ensure organisational 
survival or their own career. Monitor rates the financial and governance performance of FTs 
and has a power of intervention, which includes the removal of the board members for poor 
financial or service performance. The Government is not directly represented on the board of 
directors, but exerts its influence through regulation and Monitor. Inevitably, as a large 
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publicly funded service, the Government and Monitor are concerned about service quality 
and the use of the financial resources.  
The healthcare sector is characterised by an increasingly large proportion of female 
staff.  Recent data about the NHS workforce (HSICC, 2012) shows that women represent 
44% of the medical staff and more than 80% of the non-medical NHS workforce. Despite 
differences between the part time and full time employment of males and females, studies 
have found little or no evidence of disadvantage or discrimination against women in their 
NHS careers (Taylor et al, 2009; Dacre and Shepherd, 2010). 
 
3. Gender diversity on corporate boards. Conceptual foundations    
Boards are key for organisational performance because make strategic decisions, apply 
governance and overseen risks. The UK Code of Corporate Governance explicitly refers to 
the importance of the gender composition of boards: “The search for board candidates 
should be conducted, and appointments made, on merit, against objective criteria and with 
due regard for the benefits of diversity on the board, including gender” (FRC, 2010; p13). 
With increased public scrutiny of boards and corporate governance, it is expected that board 
composition will affect corporate reputation, especially with respect to characteristics such as 
the diversity of the board members and its gender composition (Bear et al, 2010). The low 
female presence on boards, particularly considering the long record of women in achieving 
the highest qualifications and leadership positions in many walks of life, raises the question 
of whether board recruitment is, in practice, based on skills, experience and performance 
(BIS, 2011). This argument led the FRC to issue a consultation document about gender 
diversity on boards. The specific issues that this document discusses with respect to the low 
percentage of women directors are rooted in three concerns about board effectiveness (FRC, 
2011b): 
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• that a lack of diversity around the board table may weaken the board by encouraging 
‘group think’; 
• that the low percentages of women on boards may demonstrate a failure to make full 
use of the talent pool; and 
• that boards with no, or very limited, female membership may be weak in terms of 
connectivity with, or understanding of, customers and workforce and offer little 
encouragement to aspiration among female employees. 
3.1 Gender beliefs and behaviour 
In her seminal book, Eagly (1987) set out how Social Role Theory of sex differences 
promotes a view of “social life as fundamentally gendered, given current social 
arrangements” (p31). Society has shared expectations and men and women tend to do what 
is expected of them. Beliefs or gender roles can act both as social norms and as personal 
dispositions. Typical dispositions associated with females are caring and concern for others. 
Several studies examine gender differences regarding the role of business in society. Women 
business students place more weight on corporate ethical, environmental and societal 
responsibilities than their male counterparts (Lämsä et al, 2008). Female, compared to male 
students' ethical judgments are consistently higher on business moral issues (Nguyen et al, 
2008). There are gender differences in professional fields (Ibrahim and Angelidis, 2009; 
Ibrahim et al, 2009). Females’ scores are higher for ethics and interpersonal skills and lower 
for conceptual aptitude, strategic thinking and leadership abilities among professional 
accountants (Ibrahim and Angelidis, 2009). There are also significant differences between 
female and male managers with respect to ethical values (Ibrahim et al, 2009).   
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However, other studies do not find differences between men and women on ethical 
attitudes or moderate the effects with other characteristics. McCabe et al (2006) results 
indicate that gender does not predict differences in overall ethical perceptions, although, 
when relationships between sex and individual ethical factors are explored, men perceive 
bribery as more ethical than women. In addition, Roxas and Stoneback (2004), in a study 
with junior and senior accounting students from 8 countries, find that, overall, men tend to be 
less ethical than women, but when analysing by country, this result is only valid for some 
countries, indicating background country-dependency of ethical attitudes. Moreover, Peterson 
et al (2010) find that gender accounted for less variance in ethical behaviour scores than 
nationality alone. Valentine and Rittenburg (2007) explore sex differences in ethical 
judgments and intentions to act ethically between American and Spanish business executives. 
These authors find no significant differences between males and females with respect to 
ethical judgments, although females exhibit higher intentions to act more ethically than 
males. This difference was observed for both U.S. and Spanish executives. Kaplan et al 
(2009) find that women have higher intentions to report fraudulent financial reporting using 
anonymous channels but not for non-anonymous reporting channels. Thus, these authors 
conclude that gender and what drives gender effects do not apparently manifest in every 
judgment or decision-making setting. Nevertheless, within a national public service setting, 
where ethical standards are high and female presence is common, we may observe more 
insight into how women contribute to performance. 
3.2 A multi-theory approach to the study of gender diversity on boards of directors 
Two main corporate governance theories are used in the not-for-profit and public 
sectors, the agency theory (e.g. Miller, 2002; Miller-Millesen, 2003; Van Puyvelde et al, 
2012) and the stakeholder theory (e.g. Bouckaert and Vandenhove, 1998; Gazley et al, 2010; 
Connolly et al, 2013; Wellens and Jegers, 2013). The stewardship theory is seen as a 
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particular case of the agency theory in which the owner (principal) and the management 
(agents) have similar objectives, thus, minimising traditional principal-agent conflicts (Caers 
et al, 2006).  
Connolly et al (2013) consider stakeholder theory as the obvious theory to be applied 
in the public and not-for-profit sectors because it is accepted that, in the absence of 
shareholders, other stakeholders influence managerial decisions. A stakeholder is defined as 
"any group or individual who can affect or is affected by an organisation's achievement" 
(Freeman, 1984, p46). A fundamental thesis of stakeholder-based arguments is that 
organisations should be managed in the interest of all their constituents (Laplume et al, 2008). 
Gazley et al (2010) use the stakeholder theory to model the association between board 
characteristics, external linkages and outcomes. These authors incorporate stakeholder 
diversity and gender diversity, as well as racial diversity. The board can be a tool to balance 
the diverse goals of stakeholders, so its composition is important to secure the different 
stakeholders’ interests. A stakeholder composition on public services management projects 
brings relatively similar mutual goals and makes generally favorable contributions to those 
projects (Leach et al, 2002). In FTs, the interest of the main stakeholders is related to service 
access and quality. Females have traits particularly suited to this sector  
Studies have highlighted (e.g. Boyd et al, 2011; Wellens and Jegers, 2013; Zona, 
2013), that research about corporate governance must be approached from a multi-theoretical 
perspective. In addition to the stakeholder theory, the stewardship theory also helps to 
explaining decision-making processes and goal orientation of the boards of directors of FTs. 
The stewardship theory, contrary to the agency theory, proposes that stewards are motivated 
to act in the best interests of their principals and make decisions that are in the best interests 
of the overall organisation in cases where different stakeholders express competing objectives 
(Davis et al, 1997). Stewards’ behaviour is strongly oriented towards cooperation and is 
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motivated by intrinsic, rather than extrinsic, rewards (Boyd et al, 2011). The representation of 
stakeholders on the board of directors and the social orientation of these organisations will 
most likely encourage (the members of) the board to act as stewards of the interests of 
patients.  
In the study of female presence in FTs, it is necessary to consider the stakeholder-
stewardship orientation of their boards of directors. Firstly, the board must consider the 
legitimate interests of groups and individuals who can affect or be affected by the activities of 
the organisation (Cabrera-Suarez et al, 2011). Secondly, Nolan Committee principles 
influence all members, irrelevant of their gender, of public sector entities. Thirdly, the board 
acts as a steward of the interests of their ‘main agents’ (mainly citizen and patients) and 
intrinsic rewards, such as mission alignment and responsibility, are as important as extrinsic 
rewards. These characteristics might dilute the observable benefits of gender diversity on 
boards. As the social role theory acknowledges, men and women occupy multiple social roles 
which can override gender roles, hence changing their behaviour accordingly (Boulouta, 
2013). In FTs, men may be imbued with a social orientation and high ethical values. 
Nevertheless, within public services, women have a representative role for the stakeholder 
groups and the wider community. 
It is not merely the presence of women on the board that may influence performance, 
but also the position they hold on the board. Upper echelon theory, as proposed by Hambrick 
and Mason (1984), states that “organisational outcomes…..are viewed as reflections of the 
values and cognitive bases of powerful actors in the organisation” (p193). According to this 
theory, a firm’s strategic choices reflect the values, cognitive bases, and perceptions of the 
top management team (TMT) (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). According to these authors, the 
TMT, which generally includes the Chief Executive and senior executives who hold positions 
at or above the level of vice president and report directly to the Chief Executive, has a critical 
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influence on organisational processes and outcomes. The Chief Executive is the key figure of 
the management structure because, by consistently exhibiting empowering leadership, he/she 
can facilitate the development of team potency beliefs among members (Carmeli et al, 2011). 
Empowering leadership is similar to participatory leadership, which involves the 
development of decision procedures intended to allow other people to have some influence 
over the leader's decisions. Leadership is crucial in the development of proactive teams and 
of job satisfaction and organisational commitment (Kirkman and Rosen, 1999). Leaders can 
inspire employees to believe in their capabilities to successfully perform the assigned work 
tasks and leadership plays a major role in cultivating organisational efficacy (Carmeli et al, 
2011). 
As leaders of the organisation, both the Chair and the Chief Executive are key elements 
for its performance. They are the most powerful actors within the organisation and, to better 
understand organisational outcomes, it is necessary to take into account the experiences and 
demographic characteristics of its leaders (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). These personal 
attributes of the top managers will affect their interpretations of events, which also influence 
the choices they make (Evans and Butler, 2011). Zona (2013), in a study on innovation 
investment among Italian firms, finds that chief executive characteristics are critical in board 
performance. The findings of Waldman et al (2004) suggest that the connection between top 
executives and firm outcomes goes beyond demographic characteristics and also depends to a 
large extent on the executives’ charismatic leadership.  
However, there are very few settings where women are in the uppermost positions and, 
hence, few empirical studies to develop the theory of how women in important board 
positions influence performance. Dezso and Ross (2012) argue that female representation in 
top management will most likely improve both the performance of the top management team 
itself and the motivation and commitment of women at lower managerial levels. The results 
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of Manner (2010) show that having a female Chief Executive is positively and significantly 
related to the level of corporate social performance engaged in by the firm. However, the 
author warns about drawing conclusions from this finding because of the very small 
proportion of female Chief Executives (3%) in his sample. Carpenter et al (2004) indicate 
that gender is a characteristic that needs more focus in upper echelon research. FTs provide 
an excellent scenario to advance our knowledge of gender diversity on boards as the presence 
of women, both as directors and in the uppermost echelons of their boards, is substantial.  
3.3 Gender diversity and performance 
A growing academic literature has recently been devoted to the influence of gender 
diversity in business and on boards of directors. This research has adopted different 
approaches, such as: the analysis of the gender diversity and its evolution on boards (Hillman 
et al, 2002; Nelson and Levesque, 2007; Peterson and Philpot, 2007; Ruigrok et al, 2007; 
Singh et al, 2008; Dalton and Dalton, 2010), the influence of female presence in boards on 
the performance and firm value (Carter et al, 2003: Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2008; 
Francoeur et al, 2008; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Carter et al, 2010), stock prices 
informativeness (Gul et al, 2011) and on corporate social responsibility of firms (Bear et al, 
2010; Manner, 2010; Boulouta, 2013; Hafsi and Turgut, 2013). The most common conclusion 
of these studies is that female presence has a positive influence on firm performance. 
However, there are some studies that do not find ethical differences between men and women 
or no effect of gender diversity on corporate performance (e.g. Farrel and Hersch, 2005; 
Carter et al, 2010; Sun et al, 2011).  
In relation to firm value and performance, studies find a positive association between 
these two issues and the presence of women in boards. Carter et al (2003) find a significant 
positive relationship between the ratio of women, and minorities, on the board and firm 
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value. Similarly, Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008) conclude that gender diversity has a 
positive effect on firm value and that the opposite causal relationship is not significant. 
Companies with more women in senior management are found to be more profitable and 
have higher stock returns after initial public offerings than those with fewer women in the 
management ranks (Krishnan and Parsons, 2008). Firms operating in complex environments 
generate positive and significant abnormal returns when they have a high proportion of 
women officers, that is, the presence of women in these firms seems to explain higher returns 
than those expected according to their beta, size and book-to-market ratio, variables that 
usually explain firm returns (Francoeur et al, 2008). These authors find that firms with a high 
proportion of women in both their management and governance systems generate enough 
value to maintain normal stock-market returns. Krishnan and Parsons (2008) conclude that, 
although their results do not imply that hiring more women results in increased quality of 
reported earnings, earnings quality is positively and significantly related to relatively high 
gender diversity in senior management. Jurkus et al (2011) draw similar conclusions about 
the beneficial effects of gender diversity. Their results suggest that increasing diversity in 
management can be positive for firms with weak corporate governance mechanisms. These 
authors state that, although increasing diversity does not reduce agency costs for all firms, 
evidence shows that diversity is negative and significantly related to agency costs in firms in 
less competitive markets. Stock prices of firms with gender-diverse boards reflect more firm-
specific information after controlling for corporate governance, earnings quality, institutional 
ownership and acquisition activity and that this relationship is stronger for firms with weak 
corporate governance (Gul et al, 2011). Gul et al suggest that gender-diverse boards could act 
as a substitute mechanism for corporate governance that would be otherwise weak. They also 
find that gender diversity improves the information quality of the stock price through 
increased public disclosure in large firms and by encouraging private information collection 
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in small firms. Similarly, Adams and Ferreira (2009) find that gender diversity positively 
influences performance and monitoring, particularly for firms with weak governance systems, 
because gender-diversity boards allocate more efforts to monitoring. However, in well-
governed firms, their results suggest that enforcing gender quotas in the boardroom could 
ultimately decrease shareholder value because greater gender diversity could lead to over-
monitoring in those firms.  
Other studies do not find a positive relationship between gender diversity on boards and 
financial performance. Bliss and Potter (2002) find that women are not more risk-averse than 
their male counterparts and, after controlling for potential influences, no significant 
performance differences in the management of mutual funds. Farrell and Hersch (2005) find 
that better performing firms tend to have more women on the board, but they cannot conclude 
that more gender diverse boards generate better firm performance. Similarly, Carter et al 
(2010), for a sample of major US corporations, do not find a significant relationship between 
the gender diversity of the board, or important board committees, and financial performance. 
Nonetheless, they find no evidence of any negative effect either. In addition, several studies 
(Konrad et al, 2008; Rodriguez-Dominguez et al, 2009; Bear et al, 2010; Torchia et al, 2011) 
find that the mere presence of women on boards may not be sufficient to represent a 
differential factor and that a ‘critical mass’ of women is needed to be an influential factor. 
Konrad et al (2008) conclude that, although just one woman can make a positive contribution, 
corporations with three or more women on their boards tend to benefit most from women’s 
contributions. In this situation, the presence of women directors is normalised and this allows 
them to speak and contribute more freely. However, Rodriguez-Dominguez et al (2009) use a 
different argument to justify their results. These authors argue that women might have 
adopted conventional behaviours and rules and ‘male’ roles in order to preserve their 
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positions in the corporate structure. This leads to the removal of the advantages and 
drawbacks derived from gender diversity. 
As for corporate social performance (CSP), women provide a broad range of 
contributions on boards, that play a role in enhancing corporate reputation and the firm’s 
CSP, although this is context dependent (Bear et al, 2010). Women may contribute to board 
effectiveness, particularly on CSP and strategic controls (Huse et al, 2009). Other studies find 
that greater female presence on boards positively influences CSP (Boulouta, 2013) or 
contributes to better social performance (Hafsi and Turgut, 2013). Boulouta (2013) finds that, 
when the metric is focused on negative social practices, female presence has a significant 
influence on the performance metric. She explains this result with the argument that negative 
social practices are being perceived as higher in ‘badness’ compared to the positive ones and 
induce a stronger ‘empathic caring’ response from female directors.  
Most of these studies have been conducted in contexts where the number of women on 
boards is low and it is quite infrequent that a woman is in the upper echelon of the board. 
Table 1 summarises, from a sample of the academic studies previously cited, the context of 
the analysis of female presence (gender diversity). Most studies are conducted in the US, 
which, according to the study of BIS (2011), in 2009 had, on average only 11.4% female 
board members. Only the studies of Huse et al (2009) and Torchia et al (2011) have been 
conducted in a context, Norwegian firms, with high female presence (around 30%) on boards. 
INSERT TABLE 1 
Studies in business firms indicate that women may be better at achieving social 
outcomes and making firms more socially responsible, whereas their ability to improve 
financial results is more mixed. Studies of gender diversity in public sector management 
found women offer notable emotional labour to an organisation, have different motivations 
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for work in the public sector and are “less hierarchical and more participatory” (see Jacobson 
et al, 2010). These differences are translated into different management styles. For city 
managers, women are more likely than their male counterparts to incorporate citizen input, 
facilitate communication and encourage citizen involvement (Fox and Schuhmann, 1999).  
 Empirical studies introduce into their analyses variables that explain firm 
performance. The size of the firm is often used as a control variable in the analysis of 
corporate governance and financial performance (Carter et al, 2010) and has been included 
by, among others, Farrell and Hersch (2005), Krishnan and Park (2005), Adams and Ferreira 
(2009), Carter et al (2010), Manner (2010) and Torchia et al (2011). The debt ratio (leverage) 
has been included, among others, by Sun et al (2011) and Gul et al (2011) as a measure of the 
risk of the firm, and by Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008) as influencing firm performance. 
The sector, or industry, of the firm was introduced, among others, by Francoeur et al (2008), 
Manner (2010) and Jurkus et al (2011) as a measured of complexity and/or the risk of the 
firm, as different industries present different risk and complexity and are affected differently 
by other variables.  
Two board-related characteristics are usually included in corporate governance 
studies: board size (see e.g. Bozec and Dia, 2007; Bennedsen et al, 2008; Cheng, 2008; 
Guest, 2009; Adams and Mehran, 2012) and board independence (Klein, 1998; Young, 2000; 
Dehaene et al, 2001; Krivogorsky, 2006; Foo and Zain, 2010). There are two main views in 
the literature regarding the influence of board size on firm performance (see e.g. Guest, 
2009). On the one hand, larger boards positively affect firm performance because they 
possess greater collective information and are more likely to have more independent 
directors, who can provide better monitoring. On the other hand, larger boards may have 
problems of coordination and communication; reaching consensus may be more difficult. The 
possibility of the presence of free-riding directors is also higher, because the cost to any 
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individual director of not exercising diligence falls in proportion to board size. Bennedsen et 
al (2008), conclude that the ‘right’ number of directors is a trade-off between the benefits of 
having sufficient competencies represented and the cost of having free-riding among 
directors. In addition, Farrell and Hersch (2005) indicate that the effect of a larger board in 
unclear in terms of gender diversity, because when board size is increased, so the probability 
of having a woman increases, the power of any individual board member is diluted. Board 
independence reflects the proportion of independent directors of the board over the total 
number of members. A high proportion of independent, or non-executive, directors signals 
better governance because these directors have an interest in protecting their own reputation 
and avoiding potential financial loss that may result from litigation (Young, 2000). 
Independent, non-executive, directors may better protect the interest of stakeholders, 
improving monitoring, but they are also less informed about the firm’s activities (Guest, 
2009), which can result in a negative influence on the firms’ operations. 
3.4 Research questions 
Our study seeks to extend understanding of gender diversity on board performance in 
a context, the NHS, characterised by a significant presence of women on boards and where 
many women hold top positions. However, it is important to take into account that FTs are 
public sector entities that provide an essential public service. Previous research about gender 
diversity on corporate boards shows mixed results in terms of financial performance. 
Indications from gender studies are that, generally, women act more ethically than men and 
are more likely to have a positive influence on non-financial performance. The influence of 
gender also appears to be related to whether women are in prominent positions and whether 
the proportion of women has reached a critical mass. However, in finding gender effects, the 
diversity of boards may be more relevant than diversity in boards. Taking all these elements 
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into account, we propose two principal research question and four supporting questions, 
which help us to frame our contribution to the issue of ‘gender diversity on boards’.  
Principal research questions 
- How do high levels of gender diversity on boards of directors affect organisational 
performance when social performance is paramount? 
- How does the position of women (Chair or Chief Executive) on the boards of 
directors affect organisational performance when social performance is paramount? 
Supporting research questions  
- 1) Do differences in female presence on boards affect financial performance when 
women are substantially present on boards? 
- 2) Do differences in female presence on boards affect social performance when 
women are substantially present on boards? 
- 3) Does the presence of women in the uppermost organisational positions (Chair 
and/or Chief Executive) of the board influence financial performance? 
- 4) Does the presence of women in the uppermost organisational positions (Chair 
and/or Chief Executive) of the board influence social performance? 
 
4. Research design 
4.1 Data sources 
Information about the board of directors has been obtained from the annual report and 
financial statements of NHS FTs. We use the financial data and annual reports for three 
financial years, 2008/09, 2009/10 and 2010/2011, of all the FTs authorised at the beginning 
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of each of those years. Table 2 presents the population and sample of FT-years used in this 
study. The initial total number of FT-year observations is 338. 22 FT-year observations were 
excluded from multivariate analyses because their annual reports did not disclose information 
for all the variables included in our model. Therefore, we work with 93% of observations for 
the period, which allows us to generalise our results to the whole FT sector. 
INSERT TABLE 2 
4.2 Variables and measures 
We are interested in the effect of gender on both financial performance and service 
quality. Therefore, we use two multivariate regressions to test the influence of gender 
diversity on FTs’ performance. FTs are public hospitals and, although profit is not their 
primary aim, they are required to be financially viable and pay a return to the Department of 
Health based on the value of their net assets, i.e., a dividend on their public dividend capital. 
Monitor has oversight of their financial plans to retain and build up surpluses. The first 
multivariate regression has return on assets (ROA), measured as operating surplus divided by 
total assets less current liabilities, as the dependent variable. The second multivariate 
regression uses clinical negligence costs (in £000) as the dependent variable. Clinical 
negligence costs are used as a proxy for service quality; the higher the costs, the higher the 
patients claims because of medical mistakes or failures. Clatworthy et al (2000) use clinical 
negligence costs as an example of (bad) hospital performance and assert that the inclusion of 
clinical risk “is a clear example of the increasingly complex role and responsibility of the 
directors of NHS trusts”. This measure of service quality indicates board of directors’ 
orientation towards the main social goal of FTs, that is, the provision of safe, quality health 
services. Clinical negligence costs are expressed in financial terms. This allows us to keep the 
same model for our regressions, because the two dependent variables are expressed as 
financial figures. Clinical negligence costs are obtained from the disclosure notes to the 
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financial statements. High clinical negligence costs are, in fact, an indicator of bad clinical 
performance. The literature on gender issues also suggests that gender is more closely related 
to the alleviation of bad social outcomes (Boulouta, 2013). The female gender traits of 
empathy, caring and concern for others suggest that higher female presence would improve 
clinical performance (reduce clinical negligence costs). Men also possess these traits, but it 
can be argue, as presented in Section 3, that women give them a higher priority. Clinical 
negligence costs are a measure of performance against a social goal and reflect the 
responsibility of the organisation towards its patients and users. 
Our independent variables consist of characteristics of female presence and role 
(hierarchical position) on the board of directors and include: the presence of female executive 
directors (FED), the presence of female non-executive directors (FNED), and women 
occupying the Chair (FCH) and Chief Executive (FCE) positions. FED captures the 
proportion of female executive directors on the board over the total number of executive 
members, Chair excluded. FNED captures the proportion of female non-executive directors 
on the board over the total number of non-executive members, Chair excluded. For the 
number of executive directors on the board, we have included those executive directors 
reported in the annual report as board voting and non-voting members. Non-voting members 
can influence decisions through their presence during discussions and debates prior to the 
final vote of the board. FCH is a dummy variable that takes ‘1’ when the Chair is a woman 
and ‘0’ otherwise. FCE is a dummy variable that takes ‘1’ when the chief executive is a 
woman and ‘0’ otherwise. Figures have been captured from the information disclosed about 
board composition in the annual reports of the FTs at the end of the financial year.  
In our regression models, we include board and organisation-related characteristics 
that influence the performance of organisations according to the academic literature, as 
presented in Section 3. As for board-related, we include two characteristics: board size and 
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board independence. BDsize captures the number of members of the board, including the 
Chair. BDindependence measures the independence of the board as the proportion of non-
executive directors of the board over the total number of members, excluding the Chair.  
In addition to board characteristics, we include control variables related to FT 
characteristics, namely: size, leverage and complexity, which are generally accepted as 
affecting organisational and board performance. The size of the FT is represented using the 
natural logarithm of assets employed, measured as total assets less current liabilities. 
Leverage, that is, the debt ratio, is measured as the long-term debt/total assets ratio. Clinical 
negligence can also be affected by these variables, in particular leverage, as the higher the 
level of debt, the more resources needed to pay financial costs and the fewer resources for 
service provision. Complexity is measured using a dummy variable, Nomental, which takes 
value ‘1’ when the FT is an acute or specialist hospital and ´0’ when the FT is a mental health 
hospital. This variable is included to allocate hospitals more homogeneously according to the 
complexity of the services provided, and hence risk, which affects clinical negligence costs. 
This variable is used as a proxy for the industry or sector, usually included in private sector 
studies. To allocate FTs into these two groups we have used information from Monitor’s 
website. Dummies are used to differentiate years. All these control variables might have a 
different influence on each one of the two dependent variables.  
We are interested in the effect of gender on both financial performance and service 
quality. Therefore, as stated, we use two multivariate regressions to test the influence of 
gender diversity on FT performance. We have kept the same independent and control 
variables for the two regressions and only the dependent variable, that captures one of the 
performance dimensions analysed (financial performance and service quality performance) 
varies. The regression model is expressed as follows: 
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PERFORMANCEit = β0 + β1 SIZEit + β2 LEVERAGEit+ β3 NOMENTALit + β4 
BDSIZEit + β5 BDINDEPENDENCEit+ β6 FEDit+ β7 FNEDit + β8 FCHit + β9 FCEit + β10 
YEARit 
 
5. Data analysis and results  
Descriptive figures of dependent, independent and control variables are shown in 
Table 3 for our sample of FTs. Board structure appears remarkably consistent. The average 
FT board comprises 13 directors and almost half (48%) of directors are independent non-
executive directors. The average gender balance, 40% of executive directors and 32% of 
nonexecutive directors, exceeds those found in the business sector. 
INSERT TABLE 3 
The gender diversity of FT boards, for the three year period, is shown in Table 4. A 
significant female presence on the FT boards of directors is evident. On average, each FT has 
more than 4 female directors, excluding the Chair, 2.6 female executive directors and 1.8 
female non-executive directors.  
INSERT TABLE 4 
For the 2010/11 financial year, there were 331 female executive directors from a total 
of 824 executive directors, and 240 female non-executive directors from a total of 741 non-
executive directors. The number of FTs with no female executive director is very low (3%), 
however, this more than doubles for non-executive directors, 6% for the 3 year period. About 
30% of the FTs have a woman chairing the organisation and more than one third of the FTs 
have a woman as Chief Executive. The number of FTs with half or more female presence on 
boards is substantial for executive directors (34%), though noticeably lower for non-
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executive directors (19%). Nevertheless, female presence is higher than in UK firms and 
none of the FT boards are solely composed by men. 
Results of the two regression models are shown in Table 5. For the financial 
performance (ROA ratio), none of the independent variables that capture female presence is 
significant
1
. Therefore, from our results, the only possible assertion is that different female 
presence on FT boards does not significantly affect financial performance. We conjecture 
that, given that most boards have high female presence, variations in the number of women 
on the board do not significantly affect financial performance. As for the control variables, 
both the FT leverage and the type of hospital significantly influence financial performance. 
Neither the size of the board nor its independence have a significant influence on financial 
performance. The R² for this regression is 0.241. 
INSERT TABLE 5 
Our results for the service quality performance, clinical negligence costs, show that 
female presence on boards does matter, but it is the position held by the woman not the 
proportion of women that matters. The proportion of female executive and non-executive 
directors does not significantly affect clinical negligence costs, but female presence in the 
two most influential board posts, Chair and Chief Executive, does make a difference. The 
variable that captures that a woman is the chief executive (FCE) is negative and significant at 
the 1% level. The variable that captures that a woman chairs the organisation (FCH) is also 
negative and significant, but at the 10% level. That is, having a woman in any of these two 
preeminent positions results in lower clinical negligence costs, the chief executive position, 
as expected, is the most influential. Clinical negligence costs are also related to the size and 
the type of hospitals, as bigger hospitals and acute and specialist hospitals (classified as 
Nomental hospitals), those that conduct surgical operations, have higher negligence costs. 
The R² for this regression is 0.675.  
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The results of our analyses develop our theoretical understanding. Our results support 
the propositions that in a context characterised by a significant number and proportion of 
female directors, differences in female presence does not result in observable differences in 
financial performance or in the quality of healthcare provided (that is, negative answers for 
both questions 1 and 2). On the other hand, while the presence of a woman in the Chair 
and/or the Chief Executive positions does not result in differential financial performance, 
(that is a negative answer for question 3), a female Chair or Chief Executive does result in 
significantly lower clinical negligence costs, indicating better service quality or social 
performance (question 4). Our results suggest that ‘gender’ is still a differential factor on the 
board in public service organisations where social objectives are paramount. This difference 
does not relate to differences between boards when diversity on boards is substantial but to 
whether females are at the uppermost echelons of the boards. The influence is greatest when 
females are in the pre-eminent position of power, the Chief Executive. This differential factor 
is observable in the social dimension of organisational performance and does not result in 
different financial performance. This finding is in line with the female trait of caring 
identified in gender studies. Overall, the response to our main research questions, on how 
high levels of gender diversity and women in top positions on boards affect organisational 
performance when social performance is paramount, is that, once female presence on the 
majority of boards is significant, the influence of gender diversity is only observable when a 
woman occupies the Chair or Chief Executive positions where she exerts a positive influence 
on social performance.  
 
6. Discussion 
 Our study of gender diversity examines a setting, not yet found in firms, that is a 
setting characterised by a high female presence and women in top positions on boards. 
  28 
However, our results are also in the context of public healthcare organisations where service 
performance is paramount but financial constraints must be met. Devolved local bodies have 
adopted new public governance which translates business governance structures into more 
participatory, autonomous public services. Thus, boards of directors have developed through 
decentralisation, competition and more locally governed institutions. The adoption of 
corporate governance mechanisms in the public sector is not part of shareholder 
accountability, but is set in the context of democratic stakeholder accountability and 
participation. Therefore, the community and staff should be well represented in the boards of 
devolved local public bodies which provide key public services, such as hospitals, under new 
governance structures. Corporate governance mechanisms are not necessarily intended to 
result in high financial surpluses though sustainability is important, because the provision of 
quality public services is paramount. Greater local autonomy is granted to FTs in the 
expectation that they will be responsive to their local communities which will hold them to 
account. 
FTs have a significant number of directors on their boards, an average of 13 members, 
compared with FTSE 350 firms, which average 11 and 8 directors for FTSE 100 and FTSE 
250 respectively (Sealy and Vinnicombe, 2012). FT boards have to be large because of the 
need to fairly represent a diverse range of stakeholders. More board members favours female 
presence in absolute terms. In FTs, female presence is also high in relative terms. Women 
represent, on average, 36% of all the members on FT boards. All FTs have, at least, one 
woman on their board. Gender diversity is also high in UK charities, although to a lesser 
extent. Of the top 100 charities by income, women hold on average, 32% of the board 
directorships (Jarboe, 2012). 
In FTs, the female presence is higher for executive directorships than for non-
executives. Women have a long tradition of work in the healthcare sector and represent a 
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significant part of its labour force. Their presence as executive directors is a reflection of this 
fact. However, female presence among non-executive directors is lower, 40% of executive 
directors versus 32% of non-executives. Considering that, in FTs, the board is a 
representation of key stakeholders, female presence among internal stakeholders, particularly 
staff, results in a higher representation on boards. Ferlie et al (1995) found that the 
appointment of non-executive directors to the boards of NHS trusts, the predecessors of FTs, 
suggested a significant shift towards achievement orientation and away from the 
representation orientation that existed under health authorities.  
Appointing non-executives according to their professional (business) 
achievements may make them emotionally remote from the issues on which they are 
deciding and perpetuate the dominance of male directorships apparent in the business 
sector. In FTs, non-executive directors are selected by the board of governors and 
stakeholder bodies but, nevertheless, there appears to be a continuance of the move to 
appointing non-executive directors according to professional skills, such as finance and 
audit, rather than following a representative orientation that would require more female 
non-executive directors. Despite the more participatory role of the board compared to 
business firms and the introduction of more democratic processes into board 
appointments through elected governors (replacing shareholders), the non-executive 
directors do not reflect gender diversity fully. The process may be influenced by similar 
factors that result in democratic representation in parliaments. In the parliament of 
Westminster, women represent only 22.2% of seats. The representational deficit 
amongst non-executive directors in FTs could be offset by governors but, although 
Wright et al (2012) found that in FTs governors had successfully held directors to 
account, there had been a failure to achieve social ownership. Rather than exercising 
social ownership, their evidence suggested that FT executives demonstrated a tendency 
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to disempower governors from staff and stakeholder constituencies. Governors 
functioned most effectively where their relationships were close, but not too close –
‘where they serve as owls rather than sheep or donkeys’ (Wright et al, 2012; p367). 
Although the level of women on FT boards compares favourably with large firms, the 
presence of female non-executive directors on FT boards indicates a bias that also 
exists, to a lesser extent, when constituencies elect their representatives. Despite the 
strong social orientation of FTs, the stakeholder approach of their boards of directors 
and the very significant proportion of female staff, women still do not reach parity on 
those boards. This fact indicates that recommendations and guidance intended to 
achieve higher (equal) female presence on the boards of directors, particularly in firms, 
may not be successful in the near future. 
The high number of females that occupy the Chair and the Chief Executive 
positions in FTs, 29% of the Chairs and 36% of the Chief Executives seats, show the 
powerful position that many women have in these organisations. These figures are 
much higher than for private sector firms. It is in the executive role where women more 
frequently achieve the highest position. This characteristic is also observable in the 
charity sector. Of the top 100 UK charities by income, 17 of the Chairs and 25 of the 
Chief Executives are women (Jarboe, 2012). In the charity sector, 68% of the 
workforce and the majority of volunteers are women. These data reinforce the argument 
that a long tradition of skilled women working in a sector may be a determinant factor 
for their presence on boards, particularly, in executive positions.  
Our study about the influence of female presence on the boards of directors on 
performance shows that differences in the level of female presence for executive or non-
executive directorships do not appear to result in significant differences either in financial 
sustainability or in service quality, as reflected by clinical negligence costs. The lower and 
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significantly different presence of women on firm boards investigated in previous academic 
studies translates gender diversity to differences in firm’s financial performance to be either 
positive or neutral. Female presence on firm boards appears to improve social outcomes. 
However, these results are found in contexts where female presence is usually low and there 
are significant gender-composition differences between boards. Two arguments can explain 
our results.  
On the one hand, considering the ‘number of women’ on boards, Torchia et al (2011) 
conclude that, to be effective, the presence of women must be significant, rather than a mere 
presence. Most FTs have a significant presence of women on their boards, on average 4 
members representing more than one third of the board. We suggest female presence cannot 
generate differences in performance because most boards have a high number of female 
directors. Not only has a critical mass been reached, but, in FTs, gender diversity has reached 
a level where further ‘gender diversity’, that is, a higher proportion of female directors, 
cannot achieve an additional measurable influence on performance. This is in line with Hafsi 
and Turgut (2013), who question whether “a board’s actual ratio of female directors or the 
ratio relative to other boards [should] be considered a measure of diversity.....the latter is 
probably more relevant”. Our study of boards of directors suggests that gender diversity may 
cease to be a ‘differential’ factor in board performance once an appropriate level of female 
presence is assured across boards.  
On the other hand, considering the ‘role’ of the members of the board, directors are 
subject to great public scrutiny because public hospitals are key organisations in the welfare 
state. Gender differences and diversity might be diluted because of the social view that all 
board members share about the goals of these organisations. The stakeholder-stewardship 
approach to board composition enhances the focus on the interests of key stakeholders, which 
are mainly related to service quality aspects. Board members act as stewards of society, so 
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gender differences in decision making may be reduced. For firms, Rodriguez-Dominguez et 
al (2009) explain the lack of a significant influence of gender diversity on boards by arguing 
that woman adopt conventional behaviours and rules and ‘male’ roles, which leads to a 
dilution of the advantages and drawbacks derived from gender diversity. In our context, the 
opposite is possible, that is, the social goal of FTs leads men on boards to adopt social-
oriented behaviours and ‘female’ roles. The result would be the same, the dilution of gender 
differences although with different (social) consequences for organisational performance. 
However, our analyses of female presence in the uppermost positions of the board show that 
the gender factor still exists.  
Our results show that women in prominent board positions do represent a positive 
influence on hospital service quality as reflected in clinical negligence costs. This is 
consistent with earlier literature on CSP and gender leadership. Clinical negligence costs are 
reduced when FTs have a female Chair or Chief Executive. Manner (2010), following the 
upper echelon theory, finds female Chief Executives are more likely to achieve business’ 
social goals. The Chief Executive is considered particularly important in exerting a gender 
difference. In a survey of sixty NHS leaders, 67% of respondents believed the Chief 
Executive sets an organisation’s tone; just under half (49%) think the Chair performs this key 
leadership role (Grant Thornton, 2013). Women Chairs and Chief Executives are observed to 
follow established gender values of reducing bad social outcomes. No difference is found in 
the financial dimension. The influence of gender diversity appears more sensitive to ‘soft 
issues’, such as social responsibility, although this influence may partly depend on the 
negative nature of the service measure used (Boulouta, 2013). 
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7. Limitations, further research and overall conclusions 
There are limitations to our findings that require further study. Firstly, we have 
analysed differences between boards that have a strong female presence. Therefore, we 
cannot conclude that these organisations are performing better, similarly or worse than in 
cases where there are no women on boards. However, most academic literature has found 
some female presence on boards to be positive. Secondly, we have focused our study on the 
‘gender’ factor, but other diversity factors, such as different backgrounds, presence of 
minorities and personal or psychological issues, which also affect organisational 
performance, have not been considered. Nonetheless, our study is restricted to boards in a 
relative small context, boards in England belonging to the same organisation, the National 
Health Service. Thus, the presence of other diversity factors is probably homogeneously 
distributed. Finally, the public ownership and social orientation of the boards analysed may 
limit the generalisation of our results across to the private sector, although they are consistent 
with existing academic literature and theories used in the field. This paper has only examined 
one important aspect of financial performance (return on assets) and one measure of service 
outcome (clinical negligence costs). Nevertheless, our study extends understanding of gender 
role and presence through business corporate governance arrangements into devolved, public 
services. In this setting, there are more women directors (greater female presence), more 
women in top jobs and, the primary goal is not financial. Women fulfil a representational role 
for their local communities as well as enhancing diversity in governance.  
This study is restricted to one type of devolved, public service organisation (FTs 
providing public health services) and one country (England). Gender values and their effect 
may be service and country specific. The effects of substantial female presence and 
consistency across boards in other settings and outside the UK require further study. In 
Scandinavian countries there is also a high female presence on boards of directors and in the 
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UK, gender diversity is also high in charities. Further studies in public services and charities 
may add support to a performance plateau once women have climbed the cliff to achieve 
substantial presence. This is particularly important as targets and quotas for gender diversity 
are being put forward without awareness of the point at which the benefits of diversity may 
be fully achieved in terms of board performance. However, the benefits of a wider talent pool 
and greater representation of stakeholders from increased diversity would remain.  
Overall, our study indicates that increasing female presence on boards, once a 
threshold level has been reached, does not result in differences in financial results between 
boards, but may be necessary for appropriate community representation and to maintain 
social outcomes. Women become a 'differential factor' in terms of social performance, 
measured as a reduction in poor service quality, when they hold key influential seats on 
boards. Female presence in the most prominent positions, Chair or Chief Executive, improves 
clinical (social) performance. Thus, bad performance is reduced, confirming earlier literature 
suggesting that females are more effective in reducing poor social outcomes. At the highest 
level, women do appear to make a difference when leading organisations towards their social 
goals.
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NOTES: 
1
 We have conducted analyses to determine whether female membership of a board is 
statistically associated with the type of hospital. We have found a statistical difference 
between no-mental and mental hospitals for the variable FED (female executive directors). 
Therefore, we have conducted the regression with the dependent variable ROA (financial 
performance) separating the two types of hospitals. Results have shown that the influence of 
this variable on ROA is not statistically significant for the two samples. 
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Figure 1: The governance structure of a Foundation Trust 
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Table 1. Contextual setting of a sample of empirical studies of gender diversity on boards 
STUDY COUNTRY GENDER DIVERSITY 
Bliss and Potter (2002) U.S. 11% of female managers 
Carter et al (2003) U.S. 
Mean 1.09 women on boards 
9.6% of female directors  
Farrell and Hersch (2005) 
U.S. 
Mean 1 woman on boards 
  8.6% of female directors  
Campbell and Minguez-
Vera (2008) 
Spain 
3.2% of female directors  
76.3% of firms with no female directors 
Francoeur et al (2008) Canada 7% of female directors  
Adams and Ferreira (2009) U.S. 
8.5% of female directors  
39% of firms with no female director 
Bear et al (2010) U.S. 9.6% of female directors  
Huse et al (2009) Norway 30% of female directors  
Carter et al (2010) U.S. 
Mean 1.3 women on boards 
11.6% of female directors  
Manner (2010) U.S. 3% of female CEOs 
Jurkus et al (2011)  U.S. 11.7% of female directors  
Gul et al (2011) U.S. 
Mean 1 woman on boards 
9.4% of female directors  
35% of firms with no female director 
1.7% of female CEOs 
1.3% of female Chairs 
Torchia et al (2011)* Norway 
Mean 1.5 women on boards 
26% of boards with no female director 
19% of boards with 3 or more women 
Hafsi and Turgut (2013) U.S. 15% of female directors  
* Study conducted during a transition period to comply with legislation requiring 
40% of female directors on boards 
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Table 2. The total population of FTs and our sample for analysis 
 
2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 
FTs authorised at the begining 
92 117 129 
of the financial year 
FTs authorised during the  
25 12 8 
financial year* 
        
FT-year observations 92 117 129 
* Not included because financial figures for the whole year not 
available 
Total: 338 year-observations. 22 Excluded due to data availability 
 
Table 3. Descriptive variables included in the analyses (N=316) 
  Mean Std.Dev 
Assets (£000) 167,379 134,489 
Leverage 0.15 0.23 
Nomental 0.75 0.44 
BDsize 13.23 1.73 
BDindependence 0.48 0.06 
FED 0.4 0.2 
FNED 0.32 0.16 
FCH 0.28 0.48 
FCE 0.36 0.48 
   
ROA 0.03 0.08 
Clinical negligence (£000) 2,615 2,234 
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Table 4. Descriptive figures for female presence on the boards of directors of NHS FTs   
 Three years (N=334) 2010/11 (1) 
N=128   Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Number of Executive Women Directors 2.56 1.37 0 7  
Number of Non-executive Women Directors 1.84 0.97 0 5  
Proportion of female exec directors (FEDs) 0.40 0.2 0 1 331/824 
Proportion of female non-exec directors (FNEDs) 0.32 0.16 0 0.8 240/741 
Proportion of total female presence(2) 0.36 0.12 0.08 0.82 606/1693 
FTs with a Chair woman 0.29 0.46 0 1 35/128 
FTs with a Chief Executive woman 0.36 0.48 0 1 47/128 
Proportion of FTs with no FEDs 0.03 0.18 0 1 4/128 
Proportion of FTs with no FNEDs 0.06 0.24 0 1 7/128 
Proportion of FTs with no female directors 0 0 0 0 0/128 
Proportion of FTs with a majority of FEDs (3) 0.34 0.474 0 1 46/128 
Proportion of FTs with a majority of FNEDs (3) 0.19 0.4 0 1 28/128 
4 FT-year observations have been excluded because of lack of data.  
(1) This column shows for the most recent year, the financial year 2010/11, the 
number of women, or FTs, matching the condition over the total. 
(2) including Chair 
(3) 50% or more women 
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Table 5. Multivariate results for financial performance and clinical negligence costs 
  Return on Assets Clinical negligence costs 
  Std Beta Sig Std Beta Sig 
Size 0.064 0.322 0.460*** 0.000 
Leverage -0.465*** 0.000 0.200 0.579 
Nomental -0.108* 0.058 0.457*** 0.000 
BDsize -0.061 0.318 0.055 0.165 
BDindependence -0.072 0.199 -0.100 0.789 
FED 0.027 0.624 0.018 0.624 
FNED 0.049 0.340 -0.021 0.538 
FCH -0.001 0.987 -0.065* 0.064 
FCE -0.032 0.566 -0.098*** 0.007 
year09/10 -0.156** 0.014 0.231*** 0.000 
year10/11 -0.042 0.505 0.285*** 0.001 
           
R² = 0.241   R² = 0.675 
N =316   N = 316 
F = 8.782***   F = 57.359*** 
*** Significant at 0.01; ** Significant at 0.05; * Significant at 0.1  
  
